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1．　Introductlon
　　　　There　are　two　theories　of　irony　analysis　that（lerivβfrom　the　same　source，　Grice’s
th，。。y．・On。　i・・e1・van・e　th・・ry．・Th・・el・van・e・th…eti・vi・w・f　i・・ny　i・・ev・luti・na「y
。nd。，iginal　i・th・t　it　i・quit・di脆re・nt・fr・皿th・t・aditi…1・i・w　and　G・icea・・i・w・f
i。。ny．・ln・th・t・aditi・n・1・nd　G・icea皿・i・w・，　i・・且y　i・adevi・ti・n　fr・皿th・n・・m・．Qn・th・
other　hand，　in　the　relevance・theoretic　view，　iro且y　is　natural　and　exists　everywhere
without　its　use　having　been　taught．　It　seem8．　valid　since　we　hear　irony　in　daily
conversation．　Therefbre，　this　view　is　very　attractive　and　should　be　developed．　In
co且trast，　another　view　of　irony　is　caled“staged　co皿municative　acts”．　This　view　is　an
improvement　on　pretense　theory　by　Clark．　He　said　that　his　theory　goes　beyond　echoic
m。nti。。　th。。。y，　i。　th・t。・t・・iy・a・it　d・al　with　verb・l　b・t・1・・d・am・ti・i・・ny（1984）・
His　theory　supports　Grice　and　stands　in　opposition　to　Relevance　Theory．　In　this　paper，
Iwill　present　a　comparison　between　the　two　theQries　and皿y　objection　to　Clark’s　paper．
III　addition，　I　would　like　to　analyse　ironic　parody　withill　the　relevance・theoretic
approach．
　　　　　In　the　second　section，　I　will　outline　the　Principle　of　Relevance，　and　then
summarise　Wilson　and　Sperber’s　relevance　theoretic　view　of　irony　in　the　third．　In　the
next　sect三〇n，1　will　introduce　the　innovative　relevance　theoretic　apProach　toward　irony・
that　is，　Curc6’s　theory．　In　the　丘fth　section，　I　will　exa皿ine　relevance　theory’s
counterpart　theory，“staged　communicative　acts”．　After　that，　I　will　analyse　staged
communicative　acts　in　view　of　Relevance　Theory．　Finally，　I　will　examine　ironic　parody
in　the　relevance－theore七ic　fra皿ework．
2．Principle　ofRelevance
　　　　　In　this　section，　I　will　oudine　the　Principle　of　Relevance
　　　　　　　　　Relevance　theory，　in　which　understanding　utterances　al呂o　includes　a
process　of　inference，　was　developed　by　D．　Sperber　and　D．　Wilson，　who　had　studied
Grice’s　work　and　discovered　problems　in　it．　They　hold　that，“human　cognition　Is
relevance－oriented”（Wilson，2004：No。3：p．3）．　Human　beings　always　try　to　get　relevant
information　to　improve　their　cognitive　environments．　One　of　principles　describes　the
nature　of　human　as　f｛）llows：
　（2）Co9且itive　principle　of　relevance
Human　cognition　tends　to　be　geared　to　the　maximization　of　relevance（Sperber
and　Wilso皿，1995：p．260）
According　to　the　cognitive　principle　of　relevance，　hearers　expect　speakers　to
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produce　utterances　with　a　maxilnization　of　relevance：they　expect　to　obtain　the
greatest　relevance　by　the　smallest　processing　effort．　Speakers，　however，　cannot　always
satisfy　the　expectations　of　hearers　because　ofpoliteness　considerations，　their　intention
not　to　say　anything，　their　inability　to　speak　well，　and　so　on．　Considering　the“opti卑al
relgvance　i”，　they　state　the　fol1owing　princip　le：
（4）Communicative　princip｝e　of　relevance
Every　utterance　creates　a　presumption　of　its　own　optimal　relevance（Sperber
and　Wilson，1995：p．260）．
This　principle　accommodates　a　speaker’s　behavior　and　a　hearer’s　expectation：a
speaker　tries　to　produce　utteran．ces　aiming　at　optimal　relevance，　while　a　hearer
interprets　them　to　a　point　where　they　achieve　optimal　relevance．
　　　　According　to　Relevance　Theory，　when　a　hearer　interprets　an　utterance，　he
automatically　fbllows　the　fbllowing　procedure　based　on　the　two　principles　mentioned，
above：
（5）Relevance・theoretic　comprehension　procedure
（a）　Follow　a　path　of　leaSt　effbrt　in　cQmputing　cognitive　effbcts：Test
　　　interpretive　hypotheses（disambiguations，　reference　resolutio且，　implicatures，
　　　etc，）iロorder　of　accessib三lity．
（b）　Stop　when　your　expectations　of　relevance　are　satis丘ed（Wilson，2002：4）．
3．Wilso五and　Sperber’s　view　of　irony
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　馬
　　　　In　the　previous　section　we　examined　Relevance　Theory，　which　describes　the
hu皿aロcharacteristics　of　cognition　and　communicatio且．　In　this　section，　I　will　outlille
Wilson　and　Sperber’s　view　of　irony　based　on　relevance七heory．
　　　　Wilson　and　Sperber　propose　two　main　points　against　the　traditional　and　Gricean
view　of　relevance．　One　is　that　irony　is　universal　and　natural：it　is　in　every　culture　and
arises　sponta丑eously　without　being　taught　and　learned．　They　also　claim　that　there　are
three　fbatures　of　verbal　irony　in　the　relevance・theoretic丘amework．　The　first　of　these
features　is　that‘‘it　is　a　variety　of　tacit　interpretive　use，　intended　to　represent　a
thought　or　utterance　tacitly　attributed　to　someone　other　than　the　speaker（or　to　the
8peaker　herself　at　another　time．）”（Wilson，2004．　Lecture　8，　sec．3）．　The　second　feature
of　verbal　irony　is　thaポ‘it　is　a　type　of　tacit　echoic　use，　whose　main　point　is　to　indicate
the　speaker，s　attitude　to　an　attributed　utterance　or㌻hought”（乃ゴの．　The　last　claim
about　verbal　irony　is　that“it　is　a　type　of　tacit　dissociative　use”（Jbid．）．　Accor（至ing　to
Relevance　Theory，　verbal　irony　has　all　of　these　three　features．
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　　　　　How，　then，　does　a　hearer　interpret　irony　in　the　framework　of　relevance　theory？A
hearer　derives　three　types　of　meanings，　namely，　the　proposition　expressed　by　an
utterance，　explicature，　and　implicature，　after　decoding　an　utterance　in　interpreting　it．
Observe　the　following　exa皿ple：
（8）Bob：Ca七hy　is　a　good　cook
　　　Nancy：She’s　a　goo己cook　indeed．　She　can　even　cook　hot　milk　in　the皿icrowave．
In　example（8），　a　hearer　can　derive　the　fbllowiロg　explicature：
（9）Nancy　believes　that　it　is　ridiculously　wrong　of　Bob　to　think　that　Cathy　is　a　good
　　cook．
This　is　a　higherlevel　explicature　of　Nancy’s　utterance　in（8），　In　interpreting　irony，　a
higher　level　explicature　takes　a　significant　role．　However，　Speber　and　Wilson　do　not
explain　further　how　this　higller　level　explicature　will　be　derived．　Curc6　complements
their　theory　in　terms　of　metarepresentational　analysis．　In　the　next　section，　I　will
summarise　Curc6’s　theory．
4．Curc6’s　analysis　of　irony
　　　　　Curc6　attempts　to　apPly　metarepresentational　analysis　to　irony　with重n　the
丘amework　of　relevance　theory．　She　states　that“Sperber　and　Wilson　do　not　go　into
details　about　what　is　involマed　in　retrieving　a　dissociative　attitude　in　the　process　of
reaching　a　final　ironic　interpretation”，　befbre　making　her　proposal　as　to　how　a　hearer
recognizes　a　dissociative　attitude　in　regards　to　the　content　of　an　attributed　utterance
（2000：p．271）．According　to　the　Com皿unicative　Principle　of　Relevance，　in　which　the
hearer　is　entitled　to　assume　that　every　utterance　has　enough　effect　to　be　worth　the
hearer’s　effort　without　invalid　effbrt，　the　existence　of　a　contradiction　between　the
content　of　the　proposition　of　the　utterance　and　the　contextual　assumption　may　give　the
hearer　a　cue　sufEcient　to　identify　the　speaker’s　dissociative　attitude．　Tb　a（ld　to　the
clash　between　the　content　of　the　utterance　and　the　context，　parahnguistic　features
such　as　facial　expression，　gestures　and　voice　tone　provide　clues　to　the　recognition　of
the　dissociative　attitude．　There　are，　however，　other　cases　where　a　clash　between　the
content　of　the　utterance　and　context　exists，　such　as　when　a　hearer　decides　that　a
speaker　is　mistaken，　lying，　expressing　disagreement，　or　trying　to　convince　the　hearer
of　something　he　is　reluctant　to　accept．　In　this　way，　Curc6　makes　clear　the　difference
between　irony　and　other　cases　in　terms　of　embedding　the　content　of　the　proposition　of
the　utterance　and　context　in　metarepresentations．
　　　　　Consider　the　fbllowing　example：
（10）When　Bob　watches　the　lraqi　war　on　TV，　he　says：
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　　　Bob：George　W．　Bush　absolutely　hate8　war8．
Speaker　Bob　utters（10）in　the　context　where　it　i8　highly　salient　to　the　hearer　that
George　W　Bush　does　not　hate　war6．　Curc6　writes　that　the　hearer　wants　to　kno甲　Why
the　speaker　utters　p　when　it　is　8alient　to　him　that－Tp（2000：p．272）．　A　hearer　will　eml）gd
the　content　of　the　utterance　and　the　clashing　context　in　the　metarepresentation　i皿the
inferential　process　of　understanding　the　utterance．　She’argues　that　the　order　of　the
metarepre8entations　lead8　the　hearer　to　the　recog聡ition　of　an　ironical　intent，　becau8e
the　number　of　the　order　of　the皿etarepresentation8　in　which　a　clashing　contextual
a8sumption　is　e皿bedded重s　different　in　each　case　where　there　is　a　cla8h　between　the
co匝tent　of　the　utterance　and　context．
　　　　Let　me　explaia　with（10）how　a　hearer　will．embed　the　content　of　an　utterance　and
the　contextual　assump’狽奄盾氏@in　cases　8uch　as　when　a　hearer　decide8　that　a　speaker　is
皿istaken，　lying，　express重ng　di8agree皿ent，　or　t・rying　to　convince　the　hearer　of
something　he　is　reluctant　to　accept．1且each　case，　the　fir6t　premise　in　the　inferential
process　is　the　same：
（11）The　speaker　intends
　　　　　　　　the　hearer　to　know
　　　　　　　　　that　the　speaker　intends
　　　　　　　　　　the　hearer　to　believe
　　　　　　　　that　the　American　President，　George　W．　Bush　absolutely　hates　war8．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Sperber，1994：p．195；Curc6，2000：p．272）
Sperber　suggests　that‘‘fully・fledged　communicative　competence　involves，＿fbr　the
hearer，　being　capable　of　making　at　least　fburth・order　meta・representational
attributions　of　such　communicative　intentions”（1994：p．197）．　In　other　words，　the
sttategy　of‘‘sophisticated　understanding”is　re（luired（lbid・P・194・6）・In（11）the　first
order　metarepresentation　expresses　an　infbrmative　intention．　The　second　order
metarepresentation　shows　a　co皿皿unicative三ntention．　If　we　suppose　that　these
iritentions　are　attril）uted　to　the　speaker，　at　least　fourth　order　metarepresentations　will
be　needed．
　　　　The　secQnd　premise　is　a　clashing　assumption　with　the　content　of　the　utterance：
George　W．　Bush　does　not　hate　wars，　namely，「ρ．　This　is　crucial　fbr　the　hearer　to　decide
what　the　utterance　intends．　The　hearer’s　conclusion　of　whether　the　speaker　is
mistaken，1ying，　convinces　her　or　saying　irony　depends　on　how　many　order　of
matarepresentation　the　second　premise　has2．Ifthe　8econd　premise　has　the　fir8t　order，
the　hearer　will　conclude　that　the　speaker　is　mistaken　by　inference　wit｝1　the　first
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premise．　The．second　o．rder　of　the　second　premise　derives　the　hearer　to　conclude　that
the　speaker　is　lying．　In　case　of　irony，　the　second　premise　is　as　fbllows：
（12）Acase　where　the　hearer　cQncludes　that　the　speaker　is　being　ironic．
Pre加ise
　　　The　hearer　believes　that
　　　the　speaker　believes　that
　　　　the　hearer　believes　that
　　　　the　speaker　believe8　that
　　　　　George　W．　Bush　absolutely　hates　wars
　　Obη｛ゴusion：The　hearer　concludes　that　the　speaker　is　being　ironic．（Curc6，
　　　　1995：p．45．）
In　the　case　of　iroRy，　more　complex　ability　is　required　to　embed　the　clashing　contextual
a白8umption　in　the　fburth　order　metarepresentation　and　to　manipulate　it　in
interpreting孟t．　The　conclusion　ofthe　hearer　is　derived　from　the　first　premise　as　other
cases’ ≠獅п@the　premise　in　a　fburth　order　metarepresentation．
　　　　　Hence，　Curc6　argues　that　the　clash　between　the　content　of　the　utterance　and　the
context3　1eads　to　the　recognition　of　irony．　In　short，　a　hearer　yields　a　higherlevel
explicature　of　irony　by　the　clash．　T（）ullders£and　tLe　clash　of重rony，　complex
metarepresentational　ability，　fburth・order　metarepresentational　ability　is　needed．
5．Staged　Communicative　Acts
　　　　In　the　previous　two　sections　I　have　shown　the　relevallce　theoretic　view　of　irony．　h
this　section，　I　wiU　outline　staged　commmlicative　acts，　which　is　opposite　to　Relevance
Theory．　First，　I　will　exa皿ine　the　pretense　theory　as　in　the　previous　theory　of　Clark　and
represent　staged　communicative　acts．
　　　　The　pretense　theory　of　irony，　which　is　the　origin　ofthe　staged　communicative　acts，
is　proposed　by　Clark　and　Gerrig，　based　on　Grice　and　Fowler’s　suggestions．　Grice’s　idea
especially　in且uenced　this　theory，　allowing　them　to　emphasize　the　contrast　between　it
and．Sperber　and　Wilson’s　echoic　mention　theory．　Clark　and　Gerrig　claim　that　Grice’s
idea　of　irony　is　not　what　Sperber　and　Wilson　assume　it　to　be：he　did　not　think　that
irony　communicates　only　the　opposite　of　what　is　said（1984；pユ21＞．・They　believe　that
Grice，1ike　Sperber　and　Wilson，　thought　that　irony　conveys　a　feeling，　attitude，　or
evaluation　such　as　indignation　or　contempt．　But　Grice　also　thought　that　irony　is
connected　with　a　kind　of　pretense　such　as　fbllows：“To　be　ironical　is，　among　other
things，　to　pretend（as　the　etymology　suggests），　and　while　one　wants　the　pretense　to　be
recogn孟zed　as　such，　to　announce　it　as　a　pretense　would　spoil　the　effect”（1978：p．125）．
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The　pretense　theory　of　irony　is　con8tructed　by　expanding　this　idea　of　Grice．
　　　　Pretense　theory　is　developed　into“staged　communicative　acts”by　Clark．　In
8taged　communicative　act8，　the　real　situation　and　the　imaginary　situation　an
utterance　constructs　emerge：when　the　speaker　of　irony　create8　the　joint　pretense，　she
wil1　constitute　another　layer　on　the　first’　layer　in　communicat正on．　Layer　l　is　the　ba8e　or
長）undation　of　higher　layer8．　Layer　2　is‘‘like　a　theatrical　8tage　created　o豆top　of　it
［layer1】”（Clark，1996：p．355）．　In　this　kind　of　layering，　higher　layers　can　be　added
recursively　depending　on　the　type　of　commu且ication．　What，　then，　are　the　8taged
communicative　acts？Clark　explains玉n　detail：
　　　　　　　　　　The　idea［of　staged　communicative　acts】・is　that　the　speaker，　say　A且n，
　　　　　stages．fbr　Bob　a　brief　i皿provised　8cene　in　which　an　implied　Ann（1ike　an　i皿plied
　　　　　author）perfbrm8　a　sincere　communicative　act　toward　an　implied　Bob．　As
　　　　　playwright，　Ann　expects　Bob　both　to　imagine　the　8cene　and　to　appreciate　her
　　　　　Purpose　in　staging　it（p．368）．
He　goes　Qn　to　Iist　five　propertie80f　these　acts：
1．ゐinちρreteロ5θ．　A　engage8　B　in　a　joint　preten8e．
2．Communieative　aet．　The　joint　pretense　is　that　Ai4　is　perfbrming　a　si皿cere
communicative　act　toward　B孟．
3．0ワrresρondence．　A三8　to　be　taken　as　Ai，　and　B　as　Bi．
4．Contrast．　A　intend8　A　and　B　to　mutually　appreciate　the　salient　conもrasts
between　the　demonstrated　and　actual　situations．
5．Deniabilit7．　If　a8ked，　A　would　deny　meaning　fbr　B　what　Ai　meaロs　fbr　Bi。
（P．368）
Staged　communicative　acts　will　not　succeed　without　these　five　properties．
　　　　Staged　commullicative　acts　occur　in　irolly，　sarcasm，　teasing，　over8tatement，
understatement，　rhetorical　questions，　and　their　related　for皿s．　What，　then，　are　the
staged　communicative　acts　in　the　case　of　irolly？In　irony，　analysis　is　performed　by
using　the　pretense　theory，　mentioned　above，　in　the　fra皿ework　of　staged　communicative
acts．　Clark　says　that“irony　has　two　layers”（p．372）．The　speakerAand　the　addressee　B
are　at　layers　1，　and　their　implied　counterparts　Ai　and　Bi　are　at　layer　2：
Layer　2
1・ayer　1
（P．372）
Ai　is　performing　a　serious　communicative　act　for　Bi．
Aand　B　jointly　pretend　that　the　event　in　layer　2　is　taking　place．
The　speaker　A　ilnagines　scene　2　and　plays　the　role　QfAi　in　scene　2．　Scene　l　in　layer　1，
一74一
which　i8　contra8tive　to・8cene　2，　is　in　the　actual　world．　The　contrast　is　manifested　by
speaker　A’s　co且structi且g　layer　2．Aand　B　recognize　the　contrast　between　the　twQ　layers．
The　8ig且of　their　recognition　is　their　speaking　in　mock重ng，　exaggerated，　or　caricatured
voices．　B　recognize8　As　pretense　because　of　these　and　B　lets　A　know　his　recognition　by
speaki皿g　in　the　same　killds　of　voices．
　　　　　Here，　we　should　look　again　at　the　example　cited　above，　where　David　and　Mike　go
to　a　movie，　which　received　a　good　review　in　the　newspaper．　They　find，　however，　that　it
i8　not　interesting，　even　boring．　Mary　does　not　go　to　the　movie　and　asks　them　how　the
movie　was．　The　exchange　among　them　goes　as　fbllows：
（13）David（with　smile　to　Mike）：It　is　very　interesting．
　　　Mike：Ybs，　it　is．
When　David　makes　this　ironic　comment，　they　stage　a　brief　scene　in　layer　2：
Layer　2：Implied　David　tells　implied　Mike　that　the　movie　is　very　interesti取g．
Layer　1：David　and　Mike　jo重ntly　pretelld　that　the　event　in　layer　2　is　taking　place．
David　makes　Mike　imagine　scene　2，　where　the　movie　is　very　interesting　to　them　as　the
newspaper　said．　In　the　actual　world，　scene　1，　they　thi且k　that　the　movie　is　not
interesting，　that　they　wasted　their　time，　and　that　what　the　newspaper　said　is
inaccurate．　Thus，　David　highlight8　some　contra8ts　between　scene　l　and　scene　2　by　his
creating　layer　2．　Those　i且layer　l　think　of　these　contrasts　and　take　delight　in　the
“illner　circle”they　have　created．　They　recognize　that　the　movie　is　not　actually
interesting．
　　　　Thus，　the　impQrtance　of　an　ironic　act　is　to　pay　attention　to“8〃　uneXpeeted
incongruity　between　what　might　have　been（scene　2）and　what　is（scene　1＞”（Clark，
1996：p，373）．In　pretense　theory，　the　common　ground　between　a　speaker　a且d　a　hearer　is
significant，　while　in　a　staged　communicative　act　an　unexpected　incongruity　between
scene　2　and　scene　1，　which　comes　froln　the　common　ground，　is　of　great　importance．　In
staged　communicative　acts，　not　only　the　common　groun己but　also　adding　scene　2　in
layer　2　to　the　common　ground　hig血lights　the　contrast　more　clearly　than　ill　pretense
theory．
6．Clark’s　critics　of　e．choic　mention　theory
　　　　In　Clark’s　paper，　he　critiques　the　relevance　theoretic　analysis　of　irony」that　is，
echoic　mention　theory．　Cons孟der　the　fbllowing　exchange　between　Susan　and　Ellen，
which　is　used　by　Clark　to　explain　staged　cQmmunicative　acts，　They　are　talking　about
someone　they　wi11　invite　to　di皿er　but　whom　they　extremely　dislike：
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（1継蹴灘t驚蕪鰹：蔽騰難盤
　　begins　a　face　of　di8apProval　of　the　8ergeant」
　　　　　　　　　　．Okay．［At‘‘okayノ’Ellen　begins血oddi皿gl
　　Ellen：Ah
　　Su8an：Yb8　to　thank　him長｝r　an　of　hi8　help血traiuing・【Over‘‘thank”Su8an
　　raises　her　brow　to　signal“not　really”；over“ofhis　help　in”she　raiSe8　her　brow　to
§羅認灘艦盤：器畿鴇翻謙潔翻鵬器1
1。thi、　exampl。，　th・・ec・・d・tt…nce・f　Su・a血b・ld　typ・i・i…i・al・Cl・・k・t・ted
th。t　Su，。n。nd　EII。n　dia　n。t　kn。w…h・th・・and　meet　th・五・st　tim・w．h・且th・y　are
t。1ki。g，。。　th。y　did・・t　have　c・血m・n　k・・w1・dg・ab・ut　the　8e・g・a・t（lbid）・
　　　　He　said　that　that’s　why　the　echoic　mention　theory　is　unsatisfactory．　He　wellt　on　to
、ay　th。t・The　ech・i・m・nti・・，　Sp・・b・・and　Wil・・n・・g・・d・nee献b・・f・p・・ticula「
utte’ra皿ce，　but　merely　of‘popular　wi8doln　or　received　opinions．’It　i8　dif且cult　to　see
wh。t　p。P。1。，　wi・d・m…eceiセ・d・pi・童…S・・an血ight　be　e・h。i・g・”Surely　there　is　n°
P。P。1。・wi・d・m　b・tween　tw・P・・pl・．　H・w・v…there　a・e　previ・u・uttera・・es　l・ading　t°
the　ironical　uttbrance．　In　this　case，　what　is　ironically　echoed　is　an　implicature　of
S。、aゴ、　previ。u、　utt・・ance・．　Acc・・di・g　t・Wil…（2004・1ect・re　8・・ecti・n　4）・th・・e　i・a
、ase。f　i。。ny　wh。。e　ah　i・。・i・t　ech・es　th・th。・ght　b・hind・th・w・rd・1・R・1・・ance　Th…y・
。nY，。m＿i・at・d　m・a・i・g・，　wh・thε・expli・it・・i血pli・it・・an　be　ech・ed　i・・ni・ally・　ln
th。t，ase，　El1。n　d。。ives　impli・ature・th・t　S・・a且h・t・・the　serg・ant・nd　th・t・h・d・es
。。t。pPreci。t・him・t・ll．　Th・se　impli・at・・es　a・d　th・th・ught・f　i…yresembles　i・the
。。ti。n。f　i。t，rP。eti。，　u、e．　S…血ech・…eh・se　impli・atures・H・・attit・d・t・wh・t曲
。aid　i。　i・・ny　i・t・・it　diss・・i・ti・・．　S・Sp・・b・・a・d　Wil・6・’・th・・ry・…xp！・i・that　case・
Thus，　what　Clark　said　seems　to　me　invalid・
　　　　F。。th。m。，e，　Cl。，k・、　th・・ry　h・・tw・P・・bl・m・．　Fi・st，　Cl・・k’・七he・・y　i・n・t
，uit。bl，　f。。・a・va。i，ty・f　i・・ny　in　th・f・・m・f　p…dy・・C・n・id・・th・f・ll・wi・g・xa皿pl…
（15）1曲。nt。f。，。mput・・pare・t・g・apPl・with　p・・bl・皿・in　it・・perati・n・S・m・h・w
th，ir　c。mp。ter　d・es　n・t　w・・k　w・IL　Th・i・s・・，・・niversity・t・d・・t・・mes　h・m・・b・t
th。y　d。。。t　m・v・i・fr・・t・f　it・a・ily　t・丘・it・・d・refu・e　th・i茗・・n’・h・lp：Th・y・ai尋th・t
the　two　of　the皿al6ne　can　solve　this　problem．　After　a　whlle，　they　glve　up　fixing　it
themselves　alld　ask　their　son　fbr　help．1．n　a　moment，　he　fixes　it　easily．　He　says　to　them
with　a　smile．　　　’
　　　　　　The孟r　son：One　head　is　better　than　two．
This　is　an　ironical　utterance　in　the　parody　of　the　proverb，“Two　head3　are　better　than
one”．　In　Clark’s　approach　this　example　does　not　require　two　layers，　since　their　son　doeS
。。t　p。et。nd　t・b・an　impli・d・・n．　H・i・i・L・y・・1・fth・a・t・・1　w・rld・・t・d　by　Cl・・k・1・
。dditi。n，　th。，e　i，　n・unexp・・t・d　in・・ng・uity　b・tween　wh・t　might　hav・been・nd　wh・t
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is．　Evell　two　8cenes　are・not　produced．　Yet，　this　example　ha8　a　flavor　of　irony．
　　　　Here　iS　anOther　eXample．
（16）In　the　best　pai且ter　award　in　high　8chool，　Yuki　wins　the且rst　prise，　which　gives　her
achance　to　enter　a　prestigious　artist　schooL　However，　her　family　is　very　rich　and
befbre　the　award　she　had　invite〔l　all　the　judges　to　a　gorgeou8　dinner　party．　Her　riva1，
Aki　was　bom　in　a　middle　class　family　and　she　fbund　out　about　the　party。　In　fact，　Aki’s
talent　is　much　be七ter　than　Yuki’s，　but　in　the　en〔l　YUki　wぬsもhe　first　prize　and　Aki　the
8econd　prize．
Y血ki（to　Aki）：Iam　the　be8t　painter　in　thi8　high　schoo1．　I　did　my　best　to　draw　my
Plctures．
Aki：Where　there　is　money，　there’s　a　way．
In　thi8　example，　Aki’s　utterance　is　an　irony　with　palodジWhere　there　is　a　will，　there　is
away”．　Clark’s　theory　cannot　explain　this　case，　eitheL　It　is　not　suitable　fbr　their
theory　of　irouy．　In　other　words，　Aki　does　not　create　two　layers　by　pretellding　an　implied
Aki．　There’s　no　contrast　between　the　actual　situation　and　staged　scene．　However，　this
example　is　definitely　a　kind　of　irony．　Both　examples　confirm　that　Clark’s　theory　cannot
explain　all　kinds　of　verbal　iro且y．
　　　　The　other　question，　which　may　be　a　deficiency　in　Clark’s　theory，　is　how　two
communicators　call　find　out　their　jo孟nt　pretense．　Clark　said　that　in　creating　layer　2　a
8peaker　h孟ghlighted　contrasts　between　facts　and　the　imagined　world（p．372）．　That，
however，　is　dubious　becau8e　a　hearer　recognises　a　speaker’s　pretense　only　after　he
knows　the　contrasts．　Even　though　their　expression　can　be　clues　to　help　a　hearer　find
out　the　speaker’s　pretense，　the　key　points　to　know　her　pretense　are　the　contrasts．
　　　　Clark　noticed　the　importance　of　the　contrasts　by　saying“an　unexpected
incongruity”，　Yet，　no　straightfbrward　explanation　exists　fbr　how　a　hearer　understands
those　coロtra3ts　between　facts　and　the　imagilled　world．　In　fact　a　hearer　must　know
them　by　the　complicated　way　Curc6　suggests．　To　understand　the　contrasts，　the　complex
ability　to　embed　the　proposition　expressed　by　the　utterance　and　the　opposite　fact　in　the
fourth　order　metarepresentatioll　is　required．　Consider　the　example　in（13）about　the
movie　agai1L　When　Curc6’s　work　is　applied　to　this　example，　Mike’s　recognition　of　the
COntraSt　iS　aS　fbllOWS：
（17）The　speaker　intends
　　　　the　hearer　to　know
　　　　　that　the　speaker　inten〔ls
　　　　　　the　hearer　to　believe
　　　　　　　that　the　movie　is　interesting．
（Sperber，1994：p．195；Curc6，2000：p．272）
（18）The　hearer　believes　that
　　　　　the　speaker　believes　that
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the　hearer　believes　that
　　the　speaker　believes　thst
　　　　the　movie　is　not　interesting．（Curc6，1995：p．45）
The　hearer　recognizes　the　8peaker’s　utteraロce　as　in（17），　whereas　the　opposite　fact，
namely　the　premise，　is　noticed　as　in（18）．　Both　recognition8　bring　about　the　coRclusion
that　the　speaker’s　utterance　is　an　irony．　FrQm　Clark’8　point　of　view，　the　speaker’s
preten8e三8　understood　by　the　hearer　and　then　he　tries　to　act　out　a　joint　pretense．　In
other　word8，　he・realize8　two　layers　only　after　he　recognises　the　contrast　between　the
coRtent　of　the　utterance　and　the　fact　as　Curc6　mentioned．　Thus　Clark’s　analysis　is
insufficient　in　the　hearer’s　comp．rehension　of　the　conttasts，　compared　with　Curc6．
　　　　A81mentioned　above，　two　inadequacies　of　Clark’s　theory　give　evidence　of　his
theory’s　insufficiency．　What　about　Relevance　Theory’s　a且alysis　of　irony？Can　Relevance
Theory　deal　with　the　two　defects　of　Clark’s　theory　within　its　approach？At　l臼ast　the
latter　one，　that　is，．recognition　of　contrasts　ca血be．accounted　fbr　by　Curc6’s　releva職ce
theoretic　analysis，　Row　about　explanation　of　ironic　parody？Iwould　like　to　consider　it
within　the　relevance　theoretic・apProach．
　　　　Take　the　two　examples皿entioned　above　in（15）and（16）．　In（15）the　son’s
utterance　is　an　interpretive　use　ofthe　proverb　although　its　use　is　very　loose，He　echoes
the　proverb　which　his　parent’s　thought　resembles　loosely．　His　tacit　dissociation　toward
his　parents’thought　can　thereby　be　expressed．　Simultaneou81y　he　describes　the　state
of　affairs．　Consider　the　other　example　in（16）．　Also　ill　this　example，　three　fbatures　of
丘rony　are　examilled．　As　a　result，　relevance　theoretic　analysis　ca且account　fbr　ironic
parody　without　any　problems．
7．Features　of　ironic　parody
　　　　As　we　have　see且in　the　previous　section，　ironic　parody　falls　under　three　features
of　irony　within　relevance　theory．　Considering　those　exa皿ples　further，　we　can　see
diffe　re　nces　between　simple　irony　and　ironic　parody．．In　this　section　I　would　like　to
represent　it．
　　　　Here　is　a　s孟mple　example：
（19）Ken　gets　bad　scores　on　a　math　test　at　school　even　though　his　mother　warned　he
should　study　hard　befbre　the　test．　But　he　did　not　fbllow　his　mother’s　advice　and　only
pretended　to　study．　When　he　shows　her　the　test，　he　says：
　　　　Ken：Sorry，　Mom．　1　really　studied　math　hard，　but＿
　　　　Ken’s　mother：Y｛）u　did　study　math　really　hard．
Ken，s　mother’s　utterance　is　ironic．　He　fbllows　the　relevance－theoretic　comprehension
procedures　and　der重ves　the　fbllowing　explicatures：
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（20）Kel1’s　mother　believes　that　it　was　ridiculously　wrong　of　Ken　to　say　that　he　studied
math　hard．
This　explicature　is　a　higher　level　explicature．　Her　dissociation　can　be　understood　in
the　level　of　higherlevel　explicature．　Accordingly，　in　the　case　of　simple　irony，　tacit
dissociative　attitude　is　interpreted　in　the　level　of　explicature．
　　　　Consider　the　iro夏ic　p孕rody’s　example　mentioned　above　again　in（23）．　In　this
example，　a　dissociative　attitude　is　not　comprehended　in　the　level　of　higher　level
explicature　as　fbllows：
（21）Their　son　believes　that　one　head　is　better　than　two．
His　dissociation　toward　the　original　thought三s　an　implicature　as　fbllows：
（22）Input：（a）If　their　son　believes　one　head　is　better　than　two，　he　believes　that　it　is
　　　　　　　　　　　　ridiculous　that　two　heads　are　better　than　one．【Premise】
　　　hut：（b＞their　son　believes　one　head　is　better　than　two．
　　　　Output：（c）He　believes　that　it　is　ridiculous　that　two　heads　are　better　than　one．
Thus　d1ssociative　attitude　is　communicated　in　the　level　of　impli．cature．　The
dissociative　attitud．e　is　cruci．al　in　recognising　that　this　utterance　is　an　irony．　Therefbre，
this　implicature　is　stronger　thall　any　other　implicature．』
　　　　In　summary，　si皿ple　irony　is　recognized　in　the　level　of　explicature，　while　ironic
parody　is　in　the　level　of　implicature，　In　the　case　of　ironic　parody，　implicature
expressing　dissociation　toward　the　original　though．t　echoed　is　strong．　That　difference　is
within　relevance　theoretic　account，　since　dissociative　attitude　is“tacit”，　which　means
dissociation　can　be　derived　in　the　leve】．　ofexplicature　and　implicature．
8．Conclusion
　　　　On　the　basis　of　these　observations，　we　can　conclude　that　Clark’s　staged
com皿unicative　act　is　not　a　satisfactory　analYsis　of　irony　because　of　defects　of
explanation　of　ironic　parody　and　recogni．tion　of　pretense．　Moreover，　his　crl．tique　of
relevance　theory　is　weak．　In　contrast，　the　relevance　theoretic　approach　deals　with
ironic　parody．　In　addition，　Curc6　gives　further　views　of　the　cQntrast　between　the
conten．t　of　the　utterance　and　the　context，　which　is　an　important　factor　that　makes　a
hearer　interpret　an　ironical　utterance．　Moreover，　within　the　relevance　theoretic
analysis　ofirony　we　can　see　the　difference　between　simple　irony　and　ironical　parody　in
the　meaning　level　where　a　hearer　retrieves　a　speake．ピs　dissociation．
1See　Sperber　and　Wilson（1995：p．158）
2　See　Curc6（1995：p．44・5）
3　0f　course　not　only　the　clash　leads　to　the　recognition　of　irony．　Facial　expression　and
paralinguist三c　clues　significantly　assist　in　recognition・
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4Abecomes　implied　A　and　B　becomes　implied　B　in　layer　2．　Implied　A　is　abbreviated　to
Ai，　and　B　to　Bi．
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